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Trademark Law, Economics and Grey-Market Policy
In the old days, it used to be said that the Twentieth Century Motor
trademark was as good as the karat mark on gold.... [T]hey thought
that this trademark was a magic stamp which did the trick by some sort
Well, when our customers began to see that we
of voodoo power ....
never delivered an order on time and never put out a motor that didn't
have something wrong with it-the magic stamp began to work the other
way around: people wouldn't take a motor as a gift, if it was marked
Twentieth Century.
-A. Rand'

INTRODUCTION

The controversy surrounding the legality of grey-market imports has in-

creased markedly in the last few years. 2 A grey market is created by the
unauthorized importation of legitimately trademarked goods which enter the

United States against the wishes of the domestic trademark owner. The
classic case of grey-market importation occurs when a foreign manufacturer
contracts with a domestic distributor to import goods according to mutually
agreed upon terms. The U.S. dealer then registers the trademark owned by
the foreign manufacturer in the United States. The grey market is formed
when a third party buys the goods from retail or wholesale outlets in the

foreign country, imports the goods and sells them to retailers in the United
States in alleged violation of the authorized distributor's trademark rights.'

The U.S. trademarkholder claims that the grey-market importer "free-rides"
on the owner's investments in advertising and other goodwill-creating activities.

Consumers also have an interest in the grey market. Generally, more
imports mean more competition and lower consumer prices. Critics of the

1. A. RAND, ATLAs SHRUGGED 624 (1957).
2. Several significant grey-market cases were decided in 1985-86: Olympus Corp. v. United
States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986); Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks
(COPIAT) v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. granted 107 S. Ct. 642 (1987)
(hearing granted in three cases on appeal from 790 F.2d 903: K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.;
47th Street Photo, Inc. v. COPIAT; United States v. COPIAT. Consolidated argument limited
to one hour); Vivitar Corp. v. United States Customs, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Well
Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1985); Selchow & Righter Co. v.
Goldex Corp., 612 F. Supp. 19 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
3. Another grey-market scenario occurs when a domestic manufacturer opens a plant
abroad in order to manufacture goods intended for sale abroad. A third party would be creating
a grey market by buying the goods abroad, importing them into the United States and selling
them in competition with the domestically manufactured goods of the same trademark. For
other grey market fact patterns involving cross-licensing and multiple parties, see H. STEwnER
& D. VAorrs, TRANSr;ATiONAL LEAL PROBLEmS 1024 (2d ed. 1976).
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grey market, however, claim that the imports are usually not backed by a
warranty and are sometimes inferior in quality because the importer is not
obligated to follow the manufacturer's requirements for shipping and stor4
age.
The complicating factors in this scenario include a statute that on its face
seems to exclude all grey-market goods 5 and a Customs Service interpretation
of the statute which allows grey-market goods into the United States in some
situations.6 This inconsistency has spawned a great deal of conflict in the
federal courts. In two recent cases the Second and Federal Circuits ruled
that the Customs' Regulations are a reasonable agency interpretation of the
statute they implement and that grey-market goods may be imported. 7 The
District of Columbia Circuit, however, recently held that the Customs'
Regulations are invalid and that grey-market imports may not be imported
into the United States. 8
While recent court cases have been litigated, the volume of grey-market
imports has increased dramatically.9 Some estimates claim that a large percentage of all Sieko watches' 0 and approximately fifteen to twenty-five percent of all photographic equipment sold in the United States originates from
grey-market sources." Additionally, unauthorized imports comprise a large
12
percentage of all Mercedes-Benz sales in America.
This Note analyzes the grey-market issue with an emphasis on trademark
law principles and economic policy. Part I outlines the economic incentives
underlying trademark law and their relevance to grey markets. Part II discusses the legislative and judicial inconsistency in the grey-market field. Part
III analyzes recent decisions using the economic principles developed in Part
I. Part IV summarizes proposals for reform and concludes that the most
efficient solution to the problem is for the Customs Service to exclude all
grey-market imports.
I.

TRADEMARK LAW, ECONOMIC INCENTIVES AND THE GREY
MARKET

There are two ways in which an importer can realize a favorable rate of
return by importing grey-goods. First, the importer, without making any

4. See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
5. The Tariff Act of 1933 (19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982)). For the pertinent portion of § 1526,
see infra note 42.
6. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1986). For the pertinent portion of § 133.21 see infra note 47.
7. See Olympus, 792 F.2d 315; Vivitar, 761 F.2d 1552.
8. See COPIAT, 790 F.2d 903.
9. Riley, 'Gray Market' Fight Isn't Black and White, 8 NAT'L L. J. No. 7, Oct. 28, 1985,
at 22, col. 1.
10. Id.
11. Are Those Cheap Camerasfor Real?, CONSUMER REPORTS, May 1985, at 300.
12. D. Tarr, An Economic Analysis of Gray Market Imports 35, n.36 (Sept. 6, 1985)
(unpublished paper). The list of grey-market imports is long: photographic equipment, portable
radios, cassette players, watches, wines, batteries, perfumes and automobiles are some of the
largest volume imports.
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investment in the reputation of the goods, can free-ride on the existing
domestic reputation of the goods. 3 Second, the importer can free-ride on
the service offerings that the authorized importer (the trademark holder)
makes to its customers.' 4 Both of these situations involve trademark law. 5
An understanding of the economic basis of trademark law, then, is a prerequisite to any discussion of the grey market.
Trademarks protect both the consumer and the markholder. A trademark
serves to: (1) identify and distinguish goods; (2) indicate the source of origin
of the goods; (3) assure that all goods are of equal quality; (4) promote
investments in quality and advertising by the markholder; and (5) represent
goodwill.16 Once a consumer buys a goc d and finds it to be satisfactory he
can rely on the trademark to make another purchase at a later date. Through
its operation in the marketplace the trademark reduces consumer search
costs.
Once consumers are able to identify a trademarked good they may buy
it again with the expectation that it will be of similar quality. The trademark
represents an overall package of goods, reputation and service to the consumer. When trademarked goods are in use in the economy, the trademark
advertises for the manufacturer. Consumers use trademarks to identify goods
that they wish to purchase again. This tendency to make repeat purchases
7
of satisfactory goods is the basis of the producer's goodwill.1
Trademarks help to promote economic efficiency by giving the manufacturer an incentive to produce quality goods, knowing that consumers will

be able to identify and rely upon them. Trademark law promotes these

13. Free-riding is most likely to occur when an organization provides a collective benefit
to its members. In the grey-market situation, goodwill provides a collective benefit to those
who sell the goods. Not all members of the group, however, make a contribution to the
goodwill. For a discussion of free-rider problems, see P. AREEDA, ANTrRUST ANALYsis 503
(3d ed. 1981); W. NICHOLSON, MICROECONOIC THEORY 622-23 (2d ed. 1978).
14. Two other methods exist by which the grey-market importer can make a profit. The
first occurs when the importer brings genuine but inferior goods into the country. The goods
are genuinely trademarked goods but have become inferior in quality as a result of improper
handling and storage. See In the Matter of Certain Alkaline Batteries, U.S.I.T.C. Invest. No.
337-TA-165, Nov. 1984 [hereinafter Alkaline Batteries]. The second method by which an
importer can profit is to use favorable exchange rates to arbitrage the goods. This can happen
whether or not the importer is relying upon the domestic reputation of the goods to increase
their worth. For a more complete discussion of all four methods, see Knoll, Gray-Market
Imports: Causes, Consequences and Responses, 18 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 145 (1986).
15. Trademark law is implicated in almost all grey-market cases. Copyright law, however,
was recently at issue in the International Trade Commission's investigation, In re Cabbage
Patch Kids, U.S.I.T.C. Invest. No. 337-TA-231, Sept. 1985, in which the petitioner argued
that the birth certificates of the dolls were protected by copyright law. An unfair competition
claim was brought under § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982)) in Alkaline
Batteries, supra note 14. Some proponents of the grey market claim that exclusion of the greygoods can lead to price discrimination in violation of the antitrust laws. See infra note 49 and
accompanying text.
16. R. CALmAiNN, UNFAIR CoMETmON, TRADzmiAnxs & MONOPOLSs § 17.01-.04 (4th ed.
1983);

J. McCARTHY,

TRADEARKs AND UNFAIR COMPE=mON 104 (2d ed. 1984).

17. J. McCARTHY, supra note 16, at 74.
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protections for the consumer and provides incentives for the manufacturer.'
Producers and consumers alike are hurt, however, when trademark rights
are violated. For example, if infringing goods are of lesser quality than
authorized trademarked goods, the consumer will associate the infringing
goods with the whole brand of goods and downgrade his estimation of the
trademark. This downward revision hurts both the consumer and the manufacturer. The consumer can no longer rely on the trademark to tell him
that the goods he is buying are of a certain quality, and the manufacturer's
reputation is damaged through no fault of his own. Consequently, the
traditional focal point of a trademark infringement action has been the
element and degree of consumer copafusion.' 9 Infringement actions are most
easily won when there is confusion regarding the quality of the goods.20 A
more complicated action arises when the alleged infringing goods are actually
genuine goods, imported through an unauthorized chain of distributionthe grey-market scenario. The above stated principles of trademark law,
however, indicate that infringement actions should also be permitted against
grey-market goods.
While the actual quality of the grey-market goods is occasionally at issue 2'
most cases focus on the damage done to the domestic goodwill the trademark
owner and authorized dealer have developed. 22 This goodwill is developed
by warranties, quality control procedures, service staff, inventory, available
accessories, floor demonstrations, advertising and other consumer convenience offerings. Damage to goodwill is done in two ways. First, the greymarket importer can free-ride on the domestic goodwill developed by the
trademark owner. These investments in goodwill are made in expectation
that the trademark owner and retailer will receive a reward-more patronage
by the consumers.2 Part of this reward is stolen away from the trademark
owner if consumers purchase grey-market goods. This free-rider problem is
inherent in all grey markets. Second, if the grey-market importer does not
provide the same services and conveniences that the trademark owner provides there is a likelihood that the goodwill associated with the trademark
will be damaged. This damage will hurt the trademark owner because con18. R. CALLmANN, supra note 16, at § 17.04.
19. J. McCARTHY, supra note 16, at 54.
20. When the goods are not what the label claims they are the courts invariably find a
trademark infringement. In Coors v. Genderson & Sons, 486 F. Supp. 131, 136 (D. Colo.
1980), the court likened the beer defendant was selling across the United States to counterfeit
goods. The quality of the beer had so diminished that the beer was not what the label claimed
it to be.
21. In Alkaline Batteries, supra note 14, at 3, proof was offered that improper handling
and storage had damaged the quality of the batteries.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 98-114.
23. J. McCAxRHY, supra note 16, at 74. McCarthy argues that goodwill is a form of "buyer
momentum" that will result in more patronage by consumers.
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sumers will not value the trademark as highly as they otherwise might.
The argument for using trademark law to attack grey-market goods is
strongest where the authorized seller provides service in the United States.
The rationale behind excluding grey-market goods in this case is to protect
the authorized seller's investment in such service. This investment-made to
increase the value of the trademark in the United States-provides an opportunity for free-riding by grey-market operators. Investments such as the
ones made by the trademark owner and his authorized sellers have traditionally been protected in other fields of the law.?
It is harder to justify exclusion of grey-market goods when no investment
has been made in domestic goodwill. In such cases no domestic goodwill is
associated with the trademark. Hypothetically, this might occur where goods
have an international reputation that is not distinct from their reputation in
individual countries. The goods, however, would have to be of the type such
that no service after the sale or warranty coverage was needed. Exclusion
would not be justified in such cases because no investment on which the
grey-market operator could free-ride exists. This idea is reflected in the
exhaustion doctrine of trademark law which asserts that once a trademarked
good is placed into the stream of commerce anywhere in the world, the
trademark owner can no longer sustain an infringement action. - The exhaustion doctrine, however, usually does not apply when a distinct goodwill
is associated with the trademarked good.?
This distinction between situations in which free-riding can occur and
when it cannot is important. Since the market will operate more efficiently
when free-riding is prevented, courts that address the grey-market question
should recognize this distinction. 27

24. The Supreme Court in International News Service (I.N.S.) v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215, 236 (1918) reasoned that in order to encourage investments an investor should be
able to recoup his expected return. In LN.S. the court ruled that the defendant could not take
the plaintiff's news reports and use them for his own publications. The Court recognized that
the plaintiff had to be protected in order to encourage him to gather the news in the first
place.
25. Derenberg, TerritorialScope and Situs of Trademarks and Goodwill, 47 VA. L. REV.
733 (1961).
26. R. CAumANN, supra note 16, at § 17.01-.04; J. McCAxrHY, supra note 16, at 69-87.
See also Well Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700, 713 (D.N.J. 1985).
27. It is important to note that grey-market importation can occur whenever the investment
in goodwill (per unit of sales) in the United States exceeds such investment in another country.
It makes no difference whether the investment in goodwill is made by the authorized seller or
the manufacturer himself. If less is invested in goodwill in other countries than in the United
States, prices will be lower in those countries than in the United States. This will create an
opportunity for grey-market shipments from lower price areas to those in which higher prices
prevail. Grey-market importers will be free-riding on the greater investment that has been made
in the United States.
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JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

The first case to address the grey-market question was Apollinaris Co. v.
Scherer,28 in which the court refused to exclude the genuine goods imported
by an unauthorized importer into the United States. This holding was based
on the universality principle of trademark law, in which a trademark represents the good on a worldwide basis. 29 This interpretation of trademark
law has since been discredited and replaced with the territoriality principle.30
The territoriality principle was endorsed by the United States Supreme Court
in the 1920's and allows the trademark holder a separate set of rights and
3
protections in each individual country in which the trademark is registered. 1
The move from the universality principle to the territoriality principle had
significant implications for the grey-market debate.
These implications were realized by the Supreme Court in 1923 when it
decided the case of A. Bourlois & Co. v. Katzel12 The Katzel Court held
that a domestic owner of a trademark used on foreign manufactured goods
had an action against an unauthorized importer of the same goods. The
plaintiff had purchased the United States operations of a French face powder
manufacturer, including the rights to two United States trademarks, "Java"
and "Bourjois. ' 33 The consumer goodwill already associated with the goods
in the United States was not diminished as a result of the transaction. The
plaintiff imported the powder from the French manufacturer and sold it,
using packaging that was substantially similar to that used by its predecessor.
The boxes had a statement of domestic trademark registration disclosing
that the product was made in France and packaged in America.3 4 The
unauthorized importer bought the powder from the manufacturer in France,
and then imported and sold it in the United States in boxes bearing the
"Java" trademark and resembling the plaintiff's boxes.35
The court of appeals in Katzel ruled there could be no trademark violation
36
because the importation of the genuine goods did not confuse consumers.
In reversing, the Supreme Court held that the unauthorized importation and
sale of the goods by defendant violated sections 17 and 19 of the Trademark
Act of 1920, the predecessor of the Lanham Act. 37 The Court correctly

28. 27 F. 18 (E.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
29. J. McCARuam, supra note 16, at §§ 26.12, 26.17 (describing the move from the universality principle to the territoriality principle).
30. Id. See also A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
31. J.McCARTuy, supra note 16, at 54.

32. 260 U.S. 689.
33. Id. at 690.
34. Id. at 691.
35. Id.

36. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921).
37. Katzel, 260 U.S. at 690.
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recognized that the domestic goodwill associated with the trademark was
entitled to trademark protection. The court of appeals had erroneously

assumed that confusion as to source was the only relevant issue. 8 The
Supreme Court found that the box markings were similar and as a result,
consumers identified the good with the foreign manufacturer and were not
confused. The Supreme Court protected the more important goal of trade-

mark law by recognizing the investments that the trademark holder had made
in promoting the face powder in the United States. In its view, the goodwill
was distinct from the goodwill associated with the goods' manufacturer in

France.39 The Katzel decision, then, endorsed the territoriality principle of
trademark law by allowing the trademark owner a separate set of rights in
the new country of registration. 40
While Katzel was pending in the Supreme Court, Congress enacted section

526 of the Tariff Act of 1922 to remedy what it saw as a gap in trademark
protection for a domestic owner of a trademark. 41 Section 526 excludes any

goods bearing a registered trademark owned by a United States corporation42
or citizen unless the importer has permission from the trademark owner. 43
Original interpretations of section 526 barred all grey-market imports.
Subsequent interpretations of that section, however, have narrowed its application to the specific facts of the Katzel case. 44 The Katzel fact pattern
allowed the trademark owner protection when he had bought the domestic
portion of the international enterprise.
Recent interpretations of section 526 do not provide protection to the
trademark owner if he is affiliated with the foreign manufacturer. 45 These

38. Katzel, 275 F. at 543.
39. Katzel, 260 U.S. at 692.
40. Id. Osawa v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) is representative
of the prevailing interpretation of Justice Holmes' opinion in Katzel that endorses the territoriality principle.
41. The Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 741, § 526 (codified as amended in 19 U.S.C.
§ 1526 (1982)).
42. Section 526 provides in part:
[Ilt shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of foreign
manufacture if such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or
receptacle, bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or
association created or organized within, the United States, and registered in the
Patent and Trademark Office ....

19 U.S.C. § 1526(a). Section 526 also does not apply when the goods are intended for personal
use and not for resale. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(cX7) (1986).
43. See Vivitar Corp. v. United States Customs, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The Vivitar
court analyzed § 526 and concluded that no restrictions were placed on the application of the
statute up until 1936 when the "same person exception" was formulated. This exception
prohibited the application when the U.S. trademark holder and the foreign manufacturer were
the same person. Id. at 1566.
44. After 1953 the related company exception was formed. Id.
45. Wivitar held that the Customs' Regulations which restrict the application of section 526
are a reasonable administrative interpretation of the statute. Id. at 1570.
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interpretations have been codified in section 133.21 of the Customs' Regulations.4 The Regulations do not allow related companies to use section
526 nor do they allow the markholder to use section 526 if he is the same
person or corporation that owns the foreign trademark. 47 The Supreme Court,
however, has not yet addressed this narrow interpretation of section 526.48
Additionally, the limited scope of section 526 as defined in the Customs'
Regulations does not protect the economic incentives that trademark law
seeks to encourage. The concerns that gave rise to the restrictive interpretation
of section 526 have never been seriously realized. The concern apparently
was that if the markholder and manufacturer were a single international
enterprise, they would likely manipulate section 526 in order to exclude
competition and engage in price discrimination in different international
markets. While there is limited support for the price discrimination argument, 49 cases and commentators alike have not found the argument compelling.50 A monopoly is not created when the output of one manufacturer
in a competitive market is restricted. 51 Assuming arguendo that price discrimination is a valid concern, the proper tool to fight this practice would
be the antitrust laws, not the trademark laws. In attempting to fight a largely
unrealized threat of price discrimination, the narrow interpretation of section
526 allows grey-market importers to misappropriate consumer goodwill that
has been developed by the domestic trademark holder.
The antitrust issues relating to the scope of section 526 were litigated in
United States v. Guerlain.12 In Guerlain the court ruled that Katzel was
distinguishable and the protection would not be allowed when there is a

46. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1986).
47. The Customs' Regulations outline the protection of § 526 and state that the protection
is not available if:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned by the
same person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent and
subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or control... ;
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade
name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner.
19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)(2)(3).
48. The scope of the regulations in § 133.21 have been subject to some criticism. See Weil
Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700, 717 (D.N.J. 1985). The Supreme Court
will likely address the question in 1987 in Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am.
Trademarks v. United States, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. granted 107 S. Ct. 642
(1987).
49. See C. Collier, Competition Policy and Parallel Imports (Oct. 23, 1985) (unpublished
paper presented before the Second Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of
International Trade). See also Dam, Trademarks, Price Discrimination and the Bureau of
Customs, 7 J.L. EcoN. 45, 48 (1964).
50. The court in Osawa is representative of the prevailing view that the antitrust claims
with regard to grey-market goods are weak. 589 F. Supp. at 1176.
51. See P. AEEDA, supra note 13, at
262, 512.
52. 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).

1987]

GREY-MARKET POLICY

connection between the foreign manufacturer and the domestic dealer. The
court ruled that the domestic trademark holder had committed an antitrust
violation by using section 526 to exclude potential competition from greymarket importers. 53 No mention of Customs' Regulations was made in the
case. The government subsequently dropped Guerlain on appeal, believing
that Congress should resolve the apparent conflict between section 2 of the
Sherman Act and section 526 of the Tariff Act.5 4 Congress, however, never
specifically addressed the issue.
Several recent cases have concluded that the Guerlain court's concern over
an antitrust violation is untenable.55 Recent developments in antitrust law
support this conclusion. Specifically, since exclusive territory restrictions are
now analyzed under the rule of reason rather than the per se rule, it is less
likely that any antitrust violation will be found when grey-market goods are
56
excluded from importation.
In addition to section 526, Congress has passed two trademark infringement statutes which have been the subject of much grey-market litigation.
Section 42 of the Lanham Act of 1905-1 empowers the Bureau of Customs
to prevent importation of any goods which "copy or simulate a trademark
registered [in the United States]. '58 Another provision of the Lanham Act,
section 32,59 provides for a private civil action against anyone who sells or
imports goods that simulate a trademark if such use of the trademark "is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive."' 6 These latter

53. Id. at 98. The government in Guerlain alleged that defendants had .attempted to monopolize the importation and sale of trademarked perfumes through the use of § 526.
54. See the discussion regarding the Guerlain decision in Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1566-67.
55. See Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel, 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), preliminary injunction vacated 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983); Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1564; Weil, 618 F.
Supp. at 714. Moreover, it is doubtful that damage to consumer welfare could occur when
there are intrabrandrestrictions. See Liebeler, Intrabrand "Cartels" Under GTE Sylvania, 30
UCLA L. Rnv. 1, 5-6 (1982).
56. The Supreme Court in Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977) recognized
the efficiency-creating potential in exclusive territorial restraints. The exclusion of grey-market
goods results in an arrangement similar in nature to an exclusive territorial agreement. Under
GTE Sylvania the plaintiff must prove that there are anticompetitive effects before a violation
will be found.
57. Lanham Act of 1905, ch. 540, 33 Stat. 730, § 42 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §
1124 (1982)).
58. Section 42 of the Lanham Act reads in part: "no article of imported merchandise which
shall copy or simulate the name of [any merchandise of] any domestic manufacture, or manufacturer, ... or which shall copy or simulate a trademark registered in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter ... shall be admitted to entry at any customhouse of the United
States ... ." 15 U.S.C. § 1124. "Copy or simulate" has been held to be applicable to greymarket goods which are actually not copies or simulations but are the genuine goods. See
Bourjols, 263 U.S. 675.
59. Lanham Act of 1905, ch. 540, 33 Stat. 728, § 32 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. §
1114 (1963)).
60. Section 32 of the Lanham Act reads in part:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
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two statutes have been applied in several grey-market cases, and plaintiffs
have met with varied success in combating grey-market goods that infringe
the registered domestic trademark. 61 Private rights of action under the trademark laws are generally not as effective as actions which empower Customs
to exclude the goods. Often times the trademark owner cannot identify the
grey-market importer and-once he does, jurisdiction may be impossible.
Hence, he may be forced to entertain several small suits against retailers
who sell grey-market goods.62
III.

JUDICIAL INCONSISTENCY IN RECENT GREY-IARKET LITIGATION

Three principles emerge from the discussion of trademark law, Bourjois
v. Katzel, and United States v. Guerlain. First, the protection of domestic
goodwill created by a trademark owner will impart the proper incentives to
develop and maintain quality goods. Second, the Katzel decision and the
express language of section 526 suggest that grey-market imports be prohibited. Third, Guerlain and the Customs' Regulations provide for exceptions
to the general rule against grey-market imports. The inconsistency of these
principles and the failure of some courts to focus on the economic issues
underlying trademark law have led to a conflict among recent grey-market
cases.63 One line of cases ignores the domestic goodwill associated with the
trademark and interprets consumer confusion to mean confusion as to the
source or origin of the goods." These cases find no confusion because both
grey and authorized goods come from the foreign manufacturer. 6 A second
line of cases has barred importation of grey-market imports or awarded
damages on trademark infringement grounds. These cases rely on a broad
reading of Katzel and on traditional trademark protection goals. Specifically,
they protect the distinct goodwill that the trademark owner has developed.6
A misunderstanding of the goals of trademark law along with the continued
misperception of Katzel and section 526 have helped create these inconsistent
outcomes. The following analysis of these recent cases will suggest that
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive:
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant.
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1)(a).
61. See infra notes 67-126 and accompanying text.
62. See infra note 165 and accompanying text; see also Alkaline Batteries, supra note 14,
at 22. Sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were threatened if the grey-market
retailer did not divulge his source.
63. See infra notes 67-126 and accompanying text.
64. See infra text at notes 67-90.

65. See infra notes 67-90 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 91-126 and accompanying text.
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proper interpretations of the law regarding grey-market imports will result
in the exclusion of grey-market goods or successful trademark infringement
suits once the goods have arrived.
A.

Trademark Infringement Actions

Several recent cases in federal court have denied relief for a trademark
owner filing suit alleging trademark infringement against a grey-market importer. In Monte Carlo Shirt v. Daewoo International,6 the Ninth Circuit
held that an action under common law trademark principles was insufficient
because the plaintiff could not demonstrate that there was any confusion as
to the source of origin of the goods. 68 The plaintiff contracted with a foreign
manufacturer to buy, import and sell foreign made shirts. The plaintiff
owned the common law trademark rights in the United States. 69 Monte Carlo
rightfully rejected the shirts on lateness grounds under the contract.7 0 Subsequently, the manufacturer sold the shirts to its United States subsidiary
who sold them without the permission of the markholder. The plaintiff sued
both the manufacturer and the grey-market importer for common law trade7
mark infringement. '
The court reasoned that because the shirts had been made and delivered
in the appropriate way there were no quality problems.7 2 If the shirts had
been of poor quality and had been resold by the grey-market importer then
the trademark infringement action would likely have succeeded. 7 3 The court
continued its trademark analysis and concluded that because the labels indicated where the shirts were manufactured there could not be any confusion
as to the source. 74 The court's argument was logical up to this point. The
court went on to say, however, that the consumer gets exactly what he paid
for.7s In this case, a warranty policy regarding the shirt is the most likely
consumer convenience element that is missing.7 6 The consumer is likely to
be deceived by the grey-market purchase because when he relies on the
trademark he expects the purchase price to include a package of goods and

67. 707 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1983).
68. Id. at 1058.

69. Id.
70. Id. at 1057.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1056.
73. See supra note 20 and accompanying text regarding the discussion of the quality of the
goods.
74. Monte Carlo, 707 F.2d at 1058.
75. Id.
76. The court in Monte Carlo did not even address the warranty question or the possibility
that the defendant did not offer a warranty with the shirt.
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services. 77 If the warranty is lacking, something the grey-market importer is
not likely to disclose, the consumer can be misled. By ignoring the goodwill
protection function of trademark law, the Monte Carlo court subjected
consumers to possible confusion regarding the goods they purchased.
In addition, the trademark owner is hurt when a court does not protect
the goodwill function of trademark law. When the grey-market importer
does not provide the same services that the trademark owner and authorized
dealers do, damage to the reputation of the trademarked goods can occur.
This damage can result in decreased sales and lower prices for the trademarked item. Moreover, a grey-market importer realizes a benefit when he
free-rides on the reputation (goodwill) of thi trademarked goods. The trademark owner's investments in advertising, service, inventory, and warranty
programs are granting a benefit to the grey-market importer who has not
made an investment in promoting goodwill. The trademark owner, then,
will not be encouraged to develop quality goods if he knows the grey-market
importer can free-ride off of his investments. 78
Trademarks provide an incentive for producers to invest in and promote
goodwill. The markholder has invested in the product by registering the
trademark, along with making expenditures in advertising, warranting, quality control, testing, storage and servicing the product. If the consumer is
not satisfied with the product and its services, the investment is lost. The
trademark owner makes this investment because he has a property right in
the trademark. The property right should allow the holder to invest and
realize a return on the investment. The grey-market importer, however, will
not make an investment to promote goodwill because he has no property
right in the trademarked good. A portion of the return on any investment
that the grey-market importer makes will be diverted to the trademark owner.
The grey-market importer, then, will misappropriate the trademark owner's
goodwill. When the reputation of the trademarked goods suffers, the trademark holder is also hurt because the consumer is often unable to or unwilling
to distinguish between the trademark owner and the grey-market importer.
As a result, any damage to the reputation of the goods hurts the trademark
owner.

79

A similai, factual situation was before the court in El Greco Leather
Products v. Shoe World.80 The court ruled that trademarked goods rejected
by the United States trademark owner because of lateness under a contract

77.. In the case of a shirt sale, the package of goods and services is not as great as it would
be with a more complicated purchase. For example, the Osawa court devotes a discussion to
the fact that when a consumer buys a camera he expects that the sales staff will be knowledgeable
in helping him pick out the camera he needs. Osawa v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163,
1166 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
78. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
80. 599 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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could be resold without trademark violation.8' The plaintiff had contracted

with a manufacturer in Brazil to make and deliver shoes. When the shoes
were delivered after the date specified in the contract, the plaintiff rejected
the goods and the manufacturer resold them to the grey-market importer. 2
The court found that the rejection was due to lateness only and that any
defects in the quality of the shoes were insignificant.83 The court proceeded

to reject the section 1114 infringement claim because the trademark owner
had already impliedly vouched for the quality of the goods. Similar to the
Monte Carlo court, the El Greco court erred by viewing trademark goals

too narrowly. The court neglected the goodwill issue. As a result, economic
incentives to develop a quality reputation to back up a trademark were
reduced and the free-rider problem was perpetuated.
The El Greco case is representative of many cases which consider disclosure

of the origin of the goods as the primary goal of trademarks.

5

These cases

properly consider the quality of the grey-market goods and will most likely

find a trademark infringement if the grey-market goods are inferior in quality
to the authorized goods.8 6 To sever these goals of trademark law from the
goodwill protection function, however, is to defeat the most important
purpose of trademark lawY7 The consumers are concerned with the quality
of the goods and the services and policies that accompany the goods. These

concerns are not protected when courts recognize only the source of origin
function. 8 Knowing that the goods are of Japanese origin serves little purpose
when all warranty claims, repair service and other functions will be handled
in the United States. Similarly, the trademark owner is concerned about
damage to the goodwill associated with the product and free-riding by the

grey-market importer. Again, courts that make certain that the trademarked
good is where it purports to be from do not protect the trademark owner
from these problems. 9 Cases that do not consider and protect the domestic

81. Id. at 1401.
82. Id. at 1387.
83. Id. at 1390.
84. Id. Section 1114 allows the trademark owner to bring a civil action against any person
who sells imitations of the trademarked goods. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982).
85. See, e.g., Monte Carlo, 707 F.2d 1054; DEP Corp. v. Interstate Cigar, 622 F.2d 621
(2d Cir. 1980); A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921).
86. However, in Alkaline Batteries, supranote 14, at 30 the International Trade Commission
ruled that the inferiority of the grey-market batteries was not necessary to sustain the trademark
infringement claim.
87. Recent decisions, however, have begun to interpret the source of origin function so that
protection is given to the source that has any control over the quality of the goods. In most
cases, this will be the domestic trademark holder or the authorized dealer. See the district court
opinion in Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063, 1069 (E.D.N.Y.
1982), preliminary injunction vacated, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
88. J. McCAR=my, supra note 16, at 56.
89. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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goodwill developed by the trademark holder are ignoring the basic purpose
of trademarks. °
Despite the late delivery cases, 91 other domestic trademark owners have
been successful in bringing trademark infringement actions against greymarket importers. The trademark battle has been particularly fierce in the
field of imported cameras and other electronic equipment. 92 In 1982, Bell &
Howell Corporation filed suit to prevent a grey-market importer from selling
their authorized line of Mamiya cameras imported from Japan. 93 The district
court granted a preliminary injunction in finding that Masel Corporation,
the grey-market importer, had violated both sections 32 and 42 of the
Lanham Act 94 by importing the cameras and selling them under the Mamiya
trademark. 95 The court criticized Guerlain for ignoring the distinct domestic
goodwill that the trademark owner had developed96 and rejected the claim
that protection could not be given to Bell & Howell because they were partly
owned by Mamiya. The court reasoned that the origin function of trademark
law was worth protecting but interpreted the function to mean protection
for the party responsible for the quality of the goods.7
The district court's opinion in Bell & Howell is a thoughtful insight into
the way trademark protection should be applied to grey-market goods cases.
Rather than blindly accepting the Guerlain court's decision to exclude related
companies from protection, the court found that there was a distinct goodwill
despite the relation between the two companies. A correct interpretation
of trademark law resulted in a finding of infringement. The court, then,
balanced the potential harms and found the harm to the domestic goodwill
more likely to be damaging than any potential price discrimination that
might occur as a result of the exclusion of the grey-market goods. 99
Bell & Howell rests on the finding of likelihood of confusion by consumers.
The court found that the grey-market importer did not offer a warranty.' °°
The service staff, inventory and repair service of the authorized dealer were

90. Id.
91. Both El Greco and Monte Carlo involved the resale of genuine goods that were rejected
by the trademark holder because of lateness under the delivery contract.
92. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), Bell & Howell, 548 F.
Supp. 1063 and Olympus v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986) all deal with photo
equipment.
93. Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1065.
94. The court found that both 15 U.S.C. § 1114 and 15 U.S.C. § 1124, sections 32 and
42 of the Lanham Act, respectively, had been violated. Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1066,
1071.
95. Id. at 1065.
96. Id. at 1076.
97. Id. at 1069.
98. Id. at 1070.
99. Id. at 1077. The antitrust rationale in Guerlain has been assailed by other courts. See
supra note 50 and accompanying text.
100. Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1068.
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also superior to that of the grey-market importer. 101 These inconsistent offerings between authorized an unauthorized dealers resulted in consumer
confusion regarding the trademarked goods. The court of appeals reversed
Bell & Howell'02 because there was a lack of evidence that the grey-market
goods were actually inferior to the authorized imports.103 The court of appeals
to prove that a
held that in order to sustain the action, Bell & Howell had
14
significant number of consumers would likely be misled. 0
In a subsequent action, however, Bell & Howell's argument regarding the
damage done to their goodwill was vindicated. Bell & Howell's successor in
interest, Osawa Corporation, sued another grey-market importer and won. 105
The Osawa court had much the same views as Judge Leval in Bell & Howell.
Osawa offered extensive proof of the goodwill they had developed. 106 The
plaintiff only granted dealerships to those willing to provide the necessary
goodwill-enhancing services. 107 The warranty policy caused the greatest problem for the plaintiff because many consumers came to the authorized dealer
with cameras that were purchased from the grey-market importer. Fearing
damage to their reputation, Osawa repaired the grey-market cameras without
charge even though they were not required to do so.108 Osawa was, of course,
damaged by giving the repairs because they had not realized any return on
the camera because it was bought for a lower price from the grey-market
importer. The incentive to develop high quality goods and warrant them is
reduced if Osawa is forced to perform repairs on grey-market goods in order
to protect its reputation. When warranty repair service is paid for by the
trademark owner, then the grey-market importer has even less of an incentive
to maintain quality standards.
When a trademark owner excludes grey-market goods from the U.S., the
effect is similar to that obtained by an exclusive territorial restriction. The
restriction has economic efficiency creating potential because the free-rider
problem can be eliminated.I' 9 While Osawa and the authorized Mamiya
dealers maintained showrooms, an extensive inventory of parts and accessories, qualified service and repair staff and provided an extensive warranty,
the grey-market importer did none of this.110 The grey-market importer ran

101. Id.
102. Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
103. Id. at 46.

104. Id.
105. Osawa v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163.
106. Id. at 1166.
107. Id. These goodwill services include training for sales and service personnel, inventory,

demonstrations and advertising. Moreover, the trademark owner spends a considerable amount
of time inspecting the merchandise, and the dealer gives free warranty repairs.
108. Id. at 1168.

109. See supra note 56.
110. The court in Osawa recognized that:
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a mail and telephone order business from which the consumer, after searching
the market and making his choice based on the investments made by the
authorized dealer, ordered the camera for a lower price."' The grey-market
importer free-rides on all the investments that the trademark owner and
dealer have made in order to promote the goods.
Goodwill is especially important in the electronic field, such as with the
medium format cameras at issue in Osawa.12 The complicated nature of the
equipment and the need for advice and training by qualified personnel require
that a substantial investment be made by the markholder and authorized
dealer." 3 When the grey-market importer provides poor sales assistance and
repair service the trademark owner is also hurt. Testimony to this damage
is the fact that in the two years leading up to the Osawa litigation, over
4
forty -percent of authorized Mamiya dealers dropped the brand."
In Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash"5 the district court held that
trademark protection should extend to the domestic markholder's reputation. '16 The foreign manufacturer of "Lladro" ceramic and porcelain products designated Weil as the exclusive distributor in the United States. Wel
registered the "Lladro" trademark in the United States in 1966. In 1982
the defendant began to import and sell the "Lladro" product line from
Spain without the permission of Wel. Wel filed suit in the district court
in an attempt to enjoin the defendant from importing any more grey-market
7
goods under section 526 and sections 32 and 42 of the Lanham Act."
The court analyzed the development of section 32" s and concluded that
the trademark owners' reputation with respect to the goods was the element

Defendants now state that they will offer their own warranty service on their
grey Mamiya merchandise. Apart from the fact that this is a newly contrived
litigation strategy designed to deal with a glaring weakness in defendant's position,
it is also an unsatisfactory resolution that... risks to increase, rather than solve,
the problems of trademark confusion.
589 F. Supp. at 1168. The court went on to explain that the confusion problem is not alleviated
when the defendant offers a warranty, "[f]or the warranty is of value to the goodwill of the
mark only if offered by one who has the incentive to uphold the reputation of the mark." Id.
at 1169. Because the defendant has no property right in the trademark he does not have the
requisite incentive.
111. Id. at 1166. The defendant also sells grey-market cameras over the counter. A strictly
mail order business was at issue in Selchow & Righter v. Goldex, 612 F. Supp. 19 (S.D. Fla.
1985) when the defendant was selling grey-market Trivial Pursuit games through a mail order
business.
112. The Osawa court recognized the likelihood of a "continuing relationship between dealer
and customer involving advice, service, and the future purchase of specialized peripheral equipment expanding the capabilities of the camera." Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1166. Medium format
cameras are complex cameras used by professional photographers and high level hobbyists.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1168.
115. 618 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1985).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 703. See also infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
118. Well, 618 F. Supp. at 704.
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most worthy of protection.11 9 In support of the contention that the statute
was designed to protect the domestic goodwill, the court pointed out that
a 1962 amendment to section 32 eliminated the reference to confusion as to
source of origin. The revision changed the statute so that "confusion of any
kind" could be grounds for a trademark infringement. 120 The court interpreted this confusion to mean confusion "as to the identity of the company
standing behind and insuring the quality of the trademarked goods."' 21 When
there is confusion as to who is insuring the goods, the markholder's goodwill
is likely to be injured. The Weil court ruled that the domestic markholder
had developed a distinct goodwill in the United States as a result of the
warranty, providing an English language instruction booklet, engaging in
extensive advertising and establishing a nationwide dealer network.'" Because
a separate and distinct goodwill was developed in the United States by the
trademark owner, the exhaustion doctrine was inapplicable.'2 The plaintiff
proved that because of his efforts the "Lladro" product line was now well
known in America whereas it was unknown before 1966.12 Like the trademark owner in Osawa, Weil was also placed in the unenviable position of
having to warrant products imported and sold by the grey-market importer
or deny warranty protection and risk damage to its goodwill. Confusion
arises because the consumer does not know who is backing the goods at the
point of sale.' " The court, however, solved this problem and the free-rider
problems by holding that the defendant was infringing upon the plaintiff's
trademark.
Osawa and Weil have properly recognized the importance of protecting
the domestic goodwill developed by the trademark owner and his authorized
as a reasonable
dealers. This protection is warranted on policy grounds and
126
interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in Katzel.
B.

Section 526 Cases and the Related Parties
Exception Under 19 C.F.R. § 133.21

The recent cases that construe section 526 and the Customs' Regulations
are not in agreement. Some courts hold that the Customs' Regulations are

119. Id. at 706.
120. The Weil court stated: "Congress amended § 32 in 1962 deleting the source of origin
requirement 'thereby evincing a clear purpose to outlaw the use of trademarks which are likely
to cause confusion, mistake or deception of any kind, not merely of purchasers nor simply as
to source of origin.' " Id., (quoting Syntex Laboratories, Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437
F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971)) (emphasis in original).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 711.
123. Id. at 710.
124. Id. at 711.
125. Id. at 712.
126. The Katzel Court recognized that the trademark owner in the United States had a
distinct goodwill associated with the trademark, which merited protection. 260 U.S. at 692.
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a reasonable interpretation of section 526 and therefore deny protection to
a single international enterprise. 127 A less absolute approach was taken in
Vivitar v. United States Customs, when that court ruled that the Customs'
Regulations do not define the limits of section 526 coverage but merely offer
a guideline as to when Customs will enforce section 526.'2 Finally, some
cases reject Customs' Regulations outright and enforce section 526 in all
cases. 29 The following discussion concludes that the latter interpretation is
the correct one.
The court in Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs Service denied
protection to the authorized importer under the related parties exception to
section 526.130 The district court denied a motion for a preliminary injunction
to protect the United States trademark owner from grey-market imports of
perfume from France.' The plaintiff was the exclusive distributor and
trademark owner of the perfume, but the court ruled that because the
manufacturer and importer were commonly held companies the related parties exception to section 526 applied. Parfumsrelied on Customs' Regulations
and concluded that the fears outlined in Guerlain were relevant here. 32 No
discussion was devoted to the quality of the grey-market perfume or the
goodwill developed in the United States by the trademark holder because
the court presumed this to be left to a trademark infringement claim. The
court's narrow view of section 526 was inspired by an attachment to am33
biguous legislative history and the now discredited rationale of Guerlain.
A different interpretation of Customs' Regulations section 133.21 was
recently made in Vivitar v. United States Customs.1 34 Vivitar filed suit in an
attempt to compel Customs to enforce section 526 without exception. The
Court of International Trade ruled that Customs could not be forced to
exclude all grey-market goods1 35 and the court of appeals affirmed. 36 Nevertheless, the Vivitar court's support for the regulations was narrow. The court
of appeals engaged in an exhaustive analysis of legislative intent and past
administrative interpretation of section 526.137 The court concluded that there
could be no related parties limitation read into the statute on the basis of

127. See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
128. See infra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 155-71 and accompanying text.
130. 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
131. Id. at 418.
132. The Parfums court in refering to Guerlain wrote that "[iln that case, as in this one,
there was a strong relationship between the domestic trademark-holding importer and the foreign
manufacturer and an attempt by the domestic importer to monopolize the importation of the
foreign manufacturer's goods into the United States." Id. at 420.
133. Id.
134. 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
135. Vivitar Corp. v. United States Customs, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
136. Vivitar, 761 F.2d 1552.
137. Id. at 1561-68.
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congressional intent."' Judge Nies ruled that while Customs' Regulations
are a valid and reasonable exercise of administrative enforcement of section
526 they are not determinative of its scope. 139 The court found that historical
interpretations of section 526 were marked by attempts to adjust the Regulations to current judicial decisions." 40 Even though the Vivitar court upheld
section 133.21, it left the door open for a stricter application of section
526. The court ruled that even if Customs did not enforce section 526, the
markholder might still have a private right of action under that section. 141
in a private action
The court stated that if the section 526 claim is sustained
142
the court can force Customs to exclude the goods.
Despite the result in Parfums, other cases that uphold the Customs'
Regulations do so in the qualified manner that Vivitar does. In another
episode involving the camera industry the court in Olympus Corp. v. United
States upheld the Regulations. 143 Olympus filed suit seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief from the Regulations.' 44 Olympus is the authorized importer
of Japanese-manufactured cameras and accessories with exclusive rights to
sales made by the
distribution. The case stemmed from Olympus 14brand
5
discount houses, 47th Street Photo and K-Mart.
The Olympus court took a positive step forwards in recognizing, as the
Parfums court did not, that the antitrust concerns supporting Guerlain and
the Customs' Regulations are weak. 46 The court, however, found another
justification with which to uphold the Regulations. It wrote: "While we find
the regulation[s] of questionable wisdom, we believe that congressional acquiescence in the longstanding administrative interpretation of the statute
legitimates that interpretation as an exercise of Customs' enforcement discretion."' 47 While congressional acquiescence has been the rule, a longstanding interpretation of the statute has not. The court in Vivitar pointed out
in great detail the changes in the interpretation of the statute over the years. 148

138. Id. at 1565.
139. Id. at 1571.
140. Id. at 1566. See also supra note 43.
141. "Accordingly, we hold the current regulations to be valid but not controlling with
respect to the scope of protection of 19 U.S.C. 1526(a)." Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570.
142. The Vivitar court concluded by writing: "To obtain any additional protection, Vivitar
must first pursue a determination of its alleged rights against persons engaging in parallel
importation of VIVITAR photographic equipment in federal district court, and, if successful,
is entitled to have the parallel imports excluded by Customs." Id.
143. 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986).
144. Id. at 316.
145. Id. at 317.
146. The court wrote that prior to 1972, antitrust considerations supported Customs' Regulations. The decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977),
however, prompted the court to conclude that it "would seem to make reassessment of section
133.21(c) appropriate at least insofar as those regulations rest on antitrust considerations."
Olympus, 792 F.2d at 319-20.
147. Id. at 320.
148. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1561-68. See also supra text accompanying notes 137-40.
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The clear words of the statute state that all grey-market goods must be
excluded by Customs. 49 Many courts have relied upon the legislative istory
surrounding the passage of 526 as support for denying protection for related
parties. The legislative history, however, is not conclusive. 150 The floor debate
was brief and the debate revealed that there were varying reasons for the
151
passage of the bill.

While section 526 may have been passed in response to the decision at
the appellate court level in Katzel, the courts have misplaced their emphasis
on the reversal of that decision in the Supreme Court. For example, Parfums

assumed trademark protection is only to be given to an entity that has
2
purchased the business and trademarks from the foreign manufacturer.1

The form of the transaction by which the importer gained domimon over
the trademark, however, is unrelated to the real goal of trademark protection

under section 526. The Supreme Court did not emphasize the form of the
arrangement between the manufacturer and the domestic trademark owner.
The Court ruled that the goodwill the markholder had developed was distinct
from that in France and that it was being infringed by grey-market imports." 3
The Parfums court's adherence to the related parties argument and failure
to acknowledge the existence of the distinct goodwill is mistaken.

Judge Winter, dissenting in Olympus, also found the longstanding interpretation justification to be less than satisfactory. Winter wrote:
[T]he history of the regulation itself reflects the Customs Service's own
confusion over the purpose and validity of the regulation. The Service
waited some thirteen years before enacting one version of it and then
relied for the statutory basis on the Lanham Act's predecessor rather
than on Section 526. Since then, the reasons given by the Service in
support of the regulation have vaned, and even now considerable doubt
exists as to precisely what relevant policy it is intended to implement.
Congress's supposed long-standing acquiescence, therefore, is of little
weight in view of the lack of continuity in the Service's rationale.'1'

149. See supra note 42 for the text of § 526.
150. The Parfums court, for example, relied on Congressional intent to narrow the scope
of § 526. 575 F Supp. at 420. The court in Vivitar, however, concluded that "no limitations
based on indications of Congressional intent at the time of the enactment can be read into the
statute." Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1565.
151. See 62 CoNo. REc. 11, 602-05 (1922). Moreover, Judge Nies wrote in Vivitar:
Under these circumstances, the remarks of one or more Senators are an unreliable
indication of the sense of the chamber as a whole or of Congress. The only clear
indication from the debate is that Congress realized it was providing a bar to
importation even though at least one circuit (the Katzel court) would hold that
the concurrent use of the mark on the parallel import would not be an infringement.
761 F.2d at 1563. Some of the force behind the passage of § 526 came from the post World
War I acquisition of trademarks by United States companies with manufacturing sources or
contacts in Germany. Id. at 1562.
152. Parfums, 575 F Supp. at 419.
153. Katzel, 260 U.S. at 691.
154. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 322.
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Judge Winter's dissent illustrates the misleading nature of the Olympus
court's claim that the Customs Service has made a longstanding administrative interpretation of the statute. While the Customs Service has been
interpreting the statute for a long period of time, it is clear that no consistent
policy has been followed by Customs in its interpretations.
A move towards unqualified enforcement of section 526 was taken in Weil
Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash. 155 The court followed the Vivitar court's
interpretation of section 133.21 by saying that the Regulations merely outline
Customs' role in initiating administrative action under the statute.1 56 If Customs does not exclude the goods under section 526 on its own initiative, the
trademark owner can use section 526 in a private action regardless of the
related companies exception of section 133.21.157 In Weil, the court found
that section 526 had been violated, giving protection to Well even though8
Weil and the Spanish manufacturer were commonly owned companiesY.1
The court took the position that the related company exception to section
526 enforcement was unsound and resulted in many grey-market imports
that damaged the domestic goodwill of the trademark owner. The court
rejected the formalistic approach of section 133.21 and concluded that protection should always be given to a United States trademark holder when it
has developed an independent goodwill. 159 This protection should be granted
regardless of the form of the relationship between the importer and manufacturer.160
The Vivitar court noted the fact that administrative interpretations of
section 526 have traditionally tried to be consistent with current judicial
decisions.16 1 Considering the recent criticism of Guerlain and the rationale
underlying section 133.21 judicial decisions now lead to a broader interpretation of section 526.162 Because of the recent developments in antitrust law,
it appears that the free-rider problems associated with grey-market imports
clearly outweigh any potential antitrust violation perpetuated by their exclusion. 63 Additionally, the antitrust laws are better suited to deal with the
possibility of price discrimination than are trademark laws.
The decision in Vivitar also suggested a more restrictive policy towards
grey-market imports by concluding that when Customs does not exclude the
grey goods under section 526 the trademark owner can bring an action under

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

618 F. Supp. 700 (D.N.J. 1985).
Id. at 717.
Id. at 718.
Id.
Id. at 713-14.
Id. at 710-11.
Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1570. See also supra note 140.
See criticism of Guerlainin Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1556. See also supra note 48.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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15 U.S.C. § 1114 or 15 U.S.C. § 1124.64 The success of these two statutes
in helping the trademark owner is based on a possible trademark infringement
against the importer of the grey-market goods. An infringement will generally
be found if the court considers and protects the goodwill function of trademark law. The fact that many courts are sustaining such trademark infringement actions under sections 1114 and 1124 indicates that Customs
should interpret section 526 more broadly. If Customs would enforce section
526 the savings in time and litigation energy would be immense. Allowing
the grey-market goods to be imported and then subject to a trademark
infringement action forces the trademark holder to sustain a multitude of
individual trademark infringement actions. Once the goods enter the country
the grey-market importer may supply several retailers. The trademark owner
usually has a difficult time identifying the grey-market importer and actions
must be brought against each grey-market retailer.' 65 Many times the trademark holder enjoins one grey-market importer only to find that another
importer has taken his place.
The most recent disapproval of the Customs' Regulations came in an
opinion by the D.C. Circuit in Coalitionto Preserve the Integrity of American
Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States.'6 In COPIAT, a trade association
filed suit against the Customs Service, seeking to have the Regulations
declared invalid because they are inconsistent with section 526. The District
Court held that the Customs' Regulations are a sufficiently reasonable interpretation of the statute. 16 7 The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that the Reg6
ulations are inconsistent with the clear meaning of the statute.
The COPIA T court's first point of analysis was the legislative history and
intent of section 526. In refuting arguments that try to support the Regulations on the basis of legislative intent surrounding the passage of section
526, Judge Silberman wrote:
In light of the statute, its legislative history and purpose and the
contemporaneous constructions placed upon it, we conclude that Section
526 simply cannot be limited in the manner that the Customs Service
has attempted. Because Congress' intent on the issue at hand is apparent,

we must give effect to that intent irrespective of current administrative
interpretations. In Section 526, Congress defined the relevant statutory
terms with precision and did not delegate authority, explicitly or implicitly, to the Customs Service to adjust the scope of the statute in
response to its perceptions of changing economic circumstances.
What
169
the statute meant in 1922 and 1930 is what it means today.

164. Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1569.

165. See supra note 9.
166. 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
167. Coalition to Preserve The Integrity of Am. Trademark (COPIAT) v. United States, 598
F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984).
168. 790 F.2d at 905.
169. Id. at 913 (citations omitted).
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This is the language that Judge Winter relied upon in his dissent in Olympus.
It is a strong argument when compared to the Olympus court's "longstanding
administrative interpretation" justification for an administrative rule that
contradicts a statute.
The COPIA T court went on to assail the antitrust rationale for Customs'
Regulations, a rationale that in recent years only the Parfums court had
supported. After citing recent authority in the antitrust field that indicates
that pro-competitive effects can result from some vertical restrictions, 170 the
court noted that the Justice Department found no antitrust problems with
a strict application of section 526.171 The COPIAT court's reliance on the
clear meaning of the statute has a solid foundation in comparison to the
courts which rely on the vacillating interpretations of the Customs Service.
Even if the statute provided for some degree of interpretation by the Customs
Service the Regulations make for bad policy. There are no significant antitrust
concerns, and the trademark principles illustrated above all support exclusion
of grey-market goods.
Customs is the lowest cost enforcer of section 526. Because it already
inspects goods at all points of entry, the extra cost of examining goods of
related parties is minimal and could be financed through a registration fee
paid by the trademark owner. If Customs can exclude the goods at the point
of entry the grey-market importer cannot spread the goods throughout the
market. A broad application of section 526 by Customs would provide a
clear and unambiguous rule, an incentive to fairly develop domestic and
foreign markets, and an incentive to promote high quality goods and services
under a trademark.
If more courts properly recognize domestic goodwill as a trademark goal
worthy of protection, then the lax application of section 526 by Customs
will be inefficient. Considering the recent decisions that have acknowledged
the domestic goodwill and the clear mandate from Katzel to do so, the
Customs' Regulations should be changed.
IV.

REFORMS IN GREY-MARKET POLICY

The present state of the law regarding grey-market goods is unsatisfactory.
The inefficient and inconsistent manner in which the present case-by-case
method is proceeding calls for legislative or executive reform. Possibilities
170. Id. at 916.
171. The court wrote:
In fact, in a recent case the Justice Department-joined, significantly, by the
Customs Service-filed an amicus brief arguing that Section 526 raised no antitrust
concerns and ought to be enforced according to its express terms. See Brief of
United States as Amicus Curiae, Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply
Co., 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.1983).
Id. (emphasis in original).
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for reform in the area can be broken down into four categories: (1) allowing
all grey-market goods to be imported; (2) mandatory labeling of all greymarket goods as such; (3) mandatory demarking of all grey-market goods
to eliminate brand name identification; or (4) preventing the importation of
all grey-market goods.
Allowing all grey-market goods to enter the country is unwise. Individual
trademark suits would overload the judiciary and possibly result in conflicting
outcomes. This in turn would result in lower quality goods along with general
confusion and inefficiency in the marketplace. The free-rider problems associated with grey-market imports are particularly harmful.172 Unlimited entry
of all grey-market imports is not, therefore, a viable alternative.
Labeling all grey-market goods is a complicated solution, the effectiveness
of which is speculative. 73 Labeling grey-market goods could brand the goods
as inferior in the eyes of the consumer. This would cause confusion because
not all grey-market goods are, in fact, inferior. Moreover, statistics indicate
that many consumers do not read the labels on products and in many cases
brand identification is so strong that consumers will often ignore the label. 174
The effect of a labeling approach might cause enforcement problems that
could well outweigh the benefits of changing from the present case-by-case
approach to the problem. Also, labels can easily be removed.
One commentator advocates a demarking policy towards grey-market
goods. 175 This procedure involves removal or obliteration of the trademark.
While this procedure would solve the problems of trademark infringement,
demarking is impossible in some cases. Many goods cannot be successfully
demarked without resulting damage to the goods. After all, an "Izod" shirt
with a hole instead of an alligator on the breast is not a highly marketable
item. Some products are still identifiable despite the removal of the trademark. A Mercedes-Benz, for example, is likely to be recognized despite
demarking. When the goods can still be identified according to the brand,
the free-rider problem is not solved.
Banning all grey-market goods promotes the proper incentives to develop
trademarks and high quality goods because the inherent free-rider problems
are elirinated. Additionally, consumers will benefit because they know what
to expect when they purchase on a brand name basis. Cases in which a
trademark holder has not developed a distinct goodwill are undocumented
and appear to be infrequent. Moreover, the damage done as a result of
excluding grey-market goods when the trademark holder has not developed
a distinct goodwill is insignificant.

172. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
173. DeMuth, Gray Market Compromise: Demarking v. Labeling 5 (September 1985) (unpublished paper by Lexecon Inc.).
174. Id.
175. Id.
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CONCLUSION

A total ban on grey-market imports is the most efficient policy solution.
This ban should be accomplished through a vigorous enforcement of section
526. The benefits of having the goods excluded by the Customs Service and
section 526, rather than having each trademark holder pursue litigation in
different forums are pronounced. The marginal cost of the extra enforcement, considering the scope of Customs' duties at this time, is negligible.
Excluding all parallel imports will promote the proper incentives under
trademark law to develop and maintain high quality goods and promote
consumer welfare.
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